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A TALE OF TWO GREENMOSS BUILDERS 
Robert M. O’Neil 
If ever a pending Supreme Court case deserved the merciful 
disposition of “improvidently granted,” it would seem to be Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.1 Many factors seem to 
warrant such interment for an elusive and wholly unsatisfying 
controversy. Arguably, by any objective standard, this case should never 
have gone beyond a routine and little noted denial of certioriari. Against 
this unhappy background, let me offer several countervailing and 
compelling factors that seem to warrant an alternative disposition. 
  First, this was an essentially trivial dispute between a credit-rating 
company and a small private and aggrieved subscriber. As Justice 
Powell noted in his despairing coda on the final day of the 1984 Term, 
“[this case] involves only a matter of private interest to the parties. In a 
word, this is a typical common law libel suit.”2 After much wrangling 
among the Justices during nearly two years of the pendency of this case, 
it lacked any of the majesty of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan3 libel 
case, or even of the lesser but still highly visible struggles such as 
Richard Nixon’s epic argument on behalf of Time Magazine in the 
“Desperate Hours” case,4 or the bizarre if memorable stand-off between 
Robert Welch and Elmer Gertz which produced a major sequel on libel 
law and politics.5 Greenmoss Builders, in stark contrast, offered no such 
redeeming appraisal. 
  Moreover, the Vermont Supreme Court was a highly unlikely venue 
                                                     
 Clerk for Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 1962 Term; Emeritus Professor of Law and Former 
President, University of Virginia; Former President, University of Wisconsin System and Professor 
of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison; and Senior Fellow, Association of Governing Boards of 
Colleges and Universities. 
1. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
2. Justice Powell, typewritten statement of bench announcement 2 (June 24, 1985) (with 
handwritten note, author unknown, stating “As handed down 6/26/85”) (on file with the Powell 
Papers, Washington and Lee Law Library), available at 
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1355. 
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
4. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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in which to find a major First Amendment test case. Unlike even the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, which had had a few encounters with 
these issues,6 Vermont courts had little preparation or insight for such a 
dispute. 
Third, and of even greater import, Justice Powell candidly announced 
at the close of his benediction that late June day, “[t]here is, however, no 
Court opinion.”7 Thus, the protracted and painful course of litigation 
during the pendency of this case ultimately left the Justices bereft even 
of a single acceptable theory of the case. Fragmentation and division are 
one thing in constitutional jurisprudence; hopeless splintering of this sort 
is quite another, and creates consequence ranging from uncertainty to 
chaos. 
There is more. It would not be unfair to observe that the Greenmoss 
Builders case brought out the very worst among an increasingly 
contentious group of Justices. As Professor Wermiel and Mr. Levine 
candidly note, “the deliberations in Greenmoss Builders revealed deep 
‘hostility’ within the Court ‘to the New York Times v. Sullivan line of 
cases’ . . . . As a result, the case was ‘fiercely fought out’ in a manner 
largely unseen by the public . . . .”8 While falling far short of the 
cataclysmic divisions that would eventually split the high Court in the 
2000 presidential election case of Bush v. Gore,9 such intense squabbling 
over an essentially trivial tort case (albeit with constitutional 
implications) seemed unnecessary and potentially quite damaging. 
As a result of such deep internal divisions in Greenmoss Builders, one 
might fairly note that matters of First Amendment law that seemed to 
have been reasonably well resolved (if not by complete accord) between 
the Brennan and White factions following the New York Times decision 
had at least produced a tolerable modus vivendi during the 1970s. What 
Greenmoss Builders did a decade later was to reopen many old wounds 
and leave several groups of Justices essentially adrift. It would have 
seemed far better simply to have avoided granting the case at all, or after 
having taken that initial step to have taken the merciful measure of 
dismissing as “improvidently granted.” 
Finally and perhaps most damaging of all elements within this 
                                                     
6. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).  
7. Justice Powell, typewritten statement of bench announcement, supra note 2, at 2. 
8. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark that Wasn’t: A First Amendment Play in Five 
Acts, 88 WASH L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2013) (quoting Justice Brennan, 1983 Term Histories LXXXII 
(on file with the Brennan Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division) (on file with the 
Washington Law Review). 
9. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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critique, Greenmoss Builders essentially led the Court nowhere despite 
the many months of painful dissension. A satisfying outcome after 
interminable contest might at least have yielded ultimate satisfaction, but 
when the dust settled and the final decree emerged from the confusion, 
that was not to be the case. There, quite simply, I would rest my case for 
a barely visible docket order dismissing the case as “improvidently 
granted.” 
The Greenmoss Builders judgment, however, invites a completely 
different and far more satisfying scenario. An incurable optimist may 
now step up to entertain and expound a far more hopeful posture. For 
starters, readers of the Levine and Wermiel Article10 are the grateful 
beneficiaries of one of the most ambitious and accomplished case studies 
of constitutional litigation to be found anywhere. These consummate 
First Amendment experts have applied the precise tools and techniques 
of judicial surgery to a truly daunting task. Indeed, rather than urging 
dismissal of Greenmoss Builders as unwisely granted, an observer who 
was ready to take a second look in the face of an impossible task would 
appear somehow to have managed to assume and indeed complete an 
impossible task. 
In taking on that daunting assignment, Professor Wermiel and Mr. 
Levine engaged in extensive original research with an uncanny capacity 
to find the single kernel in the haystack that would help reconcile 
insights despite severe odds. The degree of access to certain of the 
Justices’ personal papers—especially those of Justice Brennan, including 
his Term notebooks and comments—have already added immeasurably 
to our understanding, extending far beyond the immediate context of 
Greenmoss Builders. What readers have now gained is a genuine judicial 
treasure trove, which simply happens to focus on a single case but 
extends far more broadly in time and space. Thus, if nothing else, the 
revival—indeed essentially the discovery—of Greenmoss Builders has 
measurably enhanced First Amendment scholarship. 
  A couple of points might be added in extenuation. As Levine and 
Wermiel’s introductory Abstract enlightens even the casual reader, their 
Article most thoughtfully addresses a number of issues, albeit far more 
clearly than did the Justices themselves. Among those issues were the 
process by which the post-New York Times decisions like Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.,11 and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,12 were 
                                                     
10. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 8. 
11. 418 U.S. 323 (1975). 
12. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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reconsidered and placed in a still evolving context; how the Justices 
struggled to make sense out of the presumed and punitive damages 
issues in libel cases; and the perplexing, forever seemingly unresolved, 
issue of the contrasting treatment of media and non-media defendants. 
By way of conclusion, let me offer my own two most persuasive and 
redeeming observations. As the co-authors themselves note near the very 
end of this timely article, “the Court now appears largely content with 
the shape of the constitutional law of defamation it crafted in Sullivan 
and Gertz.”13 Incredibly, as the authors add with a sense of obvious 
relief, “[the Court] has not deemed it necessary to consider a defamation 
case on its merits in more than two decades.”14 With some sense of 
satisfaction, they conclude by noting that “the import of Greenmoss 
Builders appears to be that, in the end, it preserved—albeit without 
fanfare—a fundamental tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence at a 
point in history when it very much remained vulnerable.”15 Thus, the 
coda of the piece appropriately reflects a high degree of ultimate 
satisfaction despite the intervening turmoil of the mid-1980s. 
Finally, of course, explicit recognition of Justice Brennan’s singular 
role merits close attention. Professor Wermiel and his co-author Seth 
Stern have noted fully in their classic Court biography the extent to 
which Justice Brennan shaped this branch of First Amendment law 
through his authorship of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan opinion.16 
As the authors of the Brennan biography note in an extensive analysis of 
the antecedents and implications of the New York Times ruling, the case 
was a natural for this “Liberal Champion.”17 In the year since Justice 
Frankfurter’s retirement—and thus the ultimate empowering of a Court 
which had lacked a solid majority for eight years—Brennan had already 
written a couple of seminal free speech and free press judgments. Such 
rulings as NAACP v. Button,18 where he advanced First Amendment 
protection for litigation on behalf of civil rights and other public 
interests against state champerty, barratry, and other such laws, already 
gave clear evidence of his primacy in this field. Thus the Chief Justice’s 
assignment of the New York Times case to Justice Brennan could hardly 
have been faulted, and the ensuing task appeared wholly congenial. Yet, 
as Wermiel and Stern have aptly observed in their biography, “[t]his 
                                                     
13. Levine & Wermiel, supra note 8, at 100. 
14. Id. 
15. Id.  
16. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 220–28 (2010). 
17. See id. at 223. 
18. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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case would prove to be another nail biter in which Brennan was not sure 
of the ultimate disposition of his allies until the very last minute. He and 
his clerks generated eight drafts in less than two months—an 
extraordinarily compressed and demanding schedule.”19 
I. GREENMOSS BUILDERS ANTECEDENTS: STATE COMMON 
LAW PRIVILEGE 
The roots of the New York Times libel ruling run far deeper than 
conventional wisdom might suggest. As early as 1908, the Kansas 
Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case of Coleman v. 
MacLennan,20 which announced as state common law the doctrine of 
“actual malice” that Justice Brennan would effectively federalize many 
years later. An appreciable minority of other states adhered to that view 
in relevant cases, while a majority of those states rejected the “actual 
malice” standard. Thus, more than a half-century of state litigation had 
already occurred before the Supreme Court addressed constitutional 
issues in the New York Times case. And until that moment in 1964, the 
state common law of libel seemed to prevail. What seemed remarkable 
was the apparent absence of state court precedent—an oversight that led 
to lead counsel Herbert Wechsler’s discovery and eventual citation in his 
brief of the ancient Kansas case.21 Of course, it was already well known, 
albeit in tort law rather than constitutional law circles. 
II.  GREENMOSS BUILDERS ANTECEDENTS: CHAPLINSKY AND 
“THE LIBELOUS” 
Now enter the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire22 case of 1942, a clear 
harbinger of the stresses and pressures of World War II. After sustaining 
the conviction of an itinerant Jehovah’s Witness preacher for uttering 
“fighting words,” a quite surprisingly unanimous Supreme Court 
announced that there were other categories of unprotected speech 
potentially subject to criminal sanctions in the public forum.23 
Specifically, said Justice Murphy (ordinarily a strong liberal voice on 
such matters): 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
                                                     
19. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 16, at 224.  
20. 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908).  
21. STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 16, at 224. 
22. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  
23. Id. at 569, 572–74.  
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the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, 
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words—those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace.24 
Such expressions, continued the Court, lest any doubt remain, “are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, are of such slight social value as 
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”25 
For current purposes, the focus of Chaplinsky falls clearly on the 
gratuitous inclusion of “the libelous” despite the absence elsewhere in 
the case on any relevant discussion. While the primary discussion 
addressed the “fighting words” exception that had been raised and drew 
the Court’s imprimatur,26 we should recall that not only has this dubious 
precedent never been overruled or seriously qualified in three quarters of 
a century, but also that much later cases have in fact periodically cited 
the case with apparent approval.27 Thus, despite the earlier antecedents 
cited by Kansas and several state courts under common law, “the 
libelous” seemed to remain as clearly beyond reach of criminal sanctions 
as did “the lewd and obscene” or “incitement to immediate violence.” 
III.  GREENMOSS BUILDERS ANTECEDENTS: “GROUP LIBEL” 
AND BEAUHARNAIS 
Even stranger in its immunity from judicial overruling was the 1952 
case Beauharnais v. Illinois,28 directed at an Illinois “group libel” 
statute. In the aftermath of World War II, largely at the urging of then 
law professor (later renowned sociologist) David Riesman, a number of 
states enacted laws that specifically criminalized racist, sexist, and anti-
Semitic epithets and other expressions that might otherwise have been 
assumed to be constitutionally protected. In a case brought against the 
White Circle League for disseminating blatantly racist messages widely 
on the streets of Chicago, the Illinois courts ruled that the statute 
provided a defense only for publication with “good motives, and for 
justifiable ends,” but that sufficed in extenuation.29 The state courts also 
                                                     
24. Id. at 571–72. 
25. Id. at 572. 
26. See id. at 572–74. 
27. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383, 399 (1992).  
28. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
29. People v. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. 1951).  
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rejected the defendants’ plea that a “clear and present danger” must exist 
before such a sanction could be imposed on expression, however hateful 
it may be.30 
A sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court immediately recognized the 
paradox that Beauharnais posed. Yet, with ample evidence of current 
racial violence in Chicago and elsewhere, Justice Frankfurter wrote for 
the majority that such forces gave validity to Illinois’ effort to “curb 
false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in 
public places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional 
impact on those to whom it was presented.”31 The dissenters were 
predictably dismayed by such a ruling. Justices Black and Douglas, who 
had mutely accepted Chaplinsky in 1942, now stood firm,32 even 
perennially citing, though informally and unofficially, Beauharnais as 
the most egregious of the Court’s First Amendment rulings during this 
period. Curiously, Justice Jackson, who had just returned from presiding 
at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, also dissented from the 
enforcement of what he perceived as an essentially immutable 
presumption of guilt.33 Curiously, Beauharnais has not fared well over 
time, and today would be cited at an advocate’s peril. 
Yet, despite ample chance to give it a decent burial in the 1970s or 
1980s, the Court never even seriously criticized the case. The simple fact 
is that for nearly three-quarters of a century, this ruling remains the 
major constitutional cloud over judicial efforts to undermine or 
invalidate efforts to blunt crude measures against racist, sexist, 
homophobic, and anti-Semitic expression. Unless “group libel laws” are 
somehow entitled to a constitutional pass from the Court on grounds that 
would set apart all other forms of “hate speech” regulation, this paradox 
persists as one of the most baffling in First Amendment law. 
Meanwhile, courts have taken a strikingly different view of campus 
and other restrictive “speech codes.” Each and every such ban on 
racially or ethnically hostile expression has been struck down, mostly by 
federal courts, and typically on both First Amendment and due process 
grounds. Indeed, the sheer unanimity of such judicial intervention is one 
of its most striking features, and one that sharply differentiates the 
treatment of defamatory speech from the disposition of hateful 
expression despite some obvious similarities.34 
                                                     
30. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. at 253. 
31. Id. at 261. 
32. See id. at 267–87 (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.). 
33. See id. at 287–305 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
34. See ROBERT M. O’NEIL, FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY 16–22 (1997).  
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IV.  GREENMOSS BUILDERS ANTECEDENTS: NEW YORK TIMES 
CO. V. SULLIVAN 
Given this necessarily abbreviated journey through the Greenmoss 
Builders saga, we now arrive at the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan35 
case. A few brief observations might be helpful in recalling the context. 
The Court’s Term of 1962 would prove to be a watershed year like no 
other in recent history. What had been at most the Warren Court in name 
only would suddenly become the Warren Court de facto as well. During 
the summer, Court observers naturally expected that Justice Frankfurter 
would remain on the bench for some additional years, perhaps even for 
decades of continuing dominance. Few were prepared for the relatively 
mild stroke he experienced during that summer, and his merciful 
decision to leave the Court rather than continuing to sit with a patent 
disability. 
On the one occasion that I personally encountered the recently retired 
Justice Frankfurter, I realized that he was now confined to a wheelchair 
during the Court’s poignant memorial service for Washington Post 
publisher and former law clerk Philip Graham. As we awaited the 
service, I felt a tug on my sleeve, and realized it was Frankfurter, who 
asked (apparently believing I was someone else), “How is Gerry 
Gunther?” Happily, I could readily respond. “Mr. Justice,” I assured 
him, “Gerry stopped by the Court just a few days ago and we had a 
delightful visit.” That seemed to fill the bill, and we then turned to the 
unbearably sad task of recalling the life of a truly eminent journalist and 
lawyer. 
A successor Justice was soon to be chosen, and was quite likely to be 
Jewish. Frankfurter was still sharp of tongue, even if now frail of limb, 
and quipped very publicly, “Well, I hope it’s not that damned traffic cop 
from Connecticut,” a disparaging reference to then-Governor Abraham 
Ribicoff, whose availability had been widely rumored, and whose 
penchant for relying on unmarked vehicles and plainclothes officers for 
aggressive law enforcement on the Merritt and Wilbur Cross Parkways 
was well known. If Frankfurter had more benign thoughts about his 
successor, he kept them quiet. 
The eventual choice was hardly a surprise on either judicial or 
political grounds. When President Kennedy promptly nominated his 
Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, to the Court, few observers 
appreciated that a massive judicial revolution was imminent. One who 
                                                     
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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did anticipate that change was the President himself, who on the first day 
of the 1962 Term entered the Supreme Court chamber, strode 
confidently up the aisle without Secret Service protection and raised his 
hand to greet the new Justice, to whom Chief Justice Earl Warren had 
just administered the oath of office. What may have been obvious to 
some, however, proved far from obvious to the two law clerks that 
Frankfurter had chosen for the coming Term. 
Both Peter Edelman (who had just clerked for the legendary Judge 
Henry Friendly) and David Filvaroff had been outstanding Harvard Law 
School students and were eminently qualified for such an honor. But 
they soon realized that they had been selected for a quite different role, 
so that a transition to the Goldberg Chambers might prove unexpectedly 
challenging. While it would have been highly inappropriate to suggest 
that either of them could have engaged in anything like lobbying, 
judicious and ultimately effective intervention eventually brought results 
on the eve of the new Court’s new Term.36 Happily, both Edelman and 
Filvaroff finally did receive Goldberg’s imprimatur, and thus to this day 
they bear two seemingly incongruous designations: clerk to Justice 
Frankfurter, October Term 1962, and clerk to Justice Goldberg. 
The ensuing Term that now opened with a full bench proved to be 
even more sharply different than any of us could have imagined. Few 
observers could have imagined how complete would be the instant 
ascendancy of the Warren-Brennan majority. To be sure, in the previous 
Term a tenuous majority of this divided Court had managed to establish 
the “one man/one vote” principle as the basis for equitable legislative 
reapportionment.37 There were a few other major rulings in the very 
early 1960s despite the generally moderate to conservative tone of those 
Terms. For example, in 1958 Justice Brennan had already (miraculously, 
as any observer would attest) managed to cobble together a bare 
majority to strike down California’s loyalty pledge required of veterans 
seeking a real property tax exemption in Speiser v. Randall.38 And with 
Justice Frankfurter’s blessing, at least two highly invasive loyalty oaths 
required of public employees from Washington State39 and Florida40 had 
been invalidated, albeit more on due process than free speech grounds. 
                                                     
36. It is unwritten judicial common law that those law clerks who are appointed to serve the Chief 
Justice remain in office if the occupant changes; those who serve Associate Justices, however, are 
entirely on their own and may or may not be invited to continue. 
37. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
38. 357 U.S. 513, 514–15, 528–29 (1958). 
39. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
40. See Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).  
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Immediately after the new Court’s initial conference in October, it 
became clear that Justice Brennan was in charge. For the first time since 
his elevation in 1956, he was now empowered to command a solid 
majority, including the Chief Justice, Justices Black and Douglas, and of 
course Justice Goldberg as his clear protégé. During a reflection and 
recollection at the end of this momentous Term, Justice Brennan asked 
Judge Richard Posner and me (as his 1962 Term clerks) how many times 
he had dissented. Each of us ventured our guess it would have been 
about ten or a dozen occasions on which he had parted company with 
Justices Black and Douglas. The Justice smiled broadly and held up 
three fingers, calling us to account for our inaccurate recollection of the 
actual count. It turned out that he had written two dissents, and joined 
Justice Clark in a third case, all involving criminal procedure issues 
where he knew Chief Justice Warren, the old California prosecutor, 
would be unlikely to concur. 
Several major First Amendment and civil rights cases dominated the 
1962 Term. For the first time, the Warren Court now had a working 
majority of votes to incorporate—or more accurately as Justice Brennan 
insisted, to “absorb”—the criminal procedure guarantees embodied in 
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
The process began, of course, with absorption of the right to counsel,41 
followed by the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unlawful search and 
seizure.42 One after another of those specific safeguards were now ready 
to be added to free speech and press guarantees, which of course had 
been embraced in the 1920s. 
The role of the First Amendment was hardly likely to be slighted in 
the process. Most notable among the cases that had been argued and 
were immediately assigned to Justice Brennan for the drafting of a 
majority opinion was the challenge by Virginia civil rights organizations 
to the Commonwealth’s statutes regulating the conduct of attorneys—
most notably those governing the curiously titled practices of 
“champerty,” “maintenance,” and “barratry.”43 The Virginia courts had 
upheld the application of such ancient laws to the filing of public interest 
litigation by civil rights groups, including the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund. The resulting judgment44 established a profoundly important 
principle, which has not only never been overruled despite the vagaries 
                                                     
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).  
42. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). 
43. See NAACP v. Harrison, 115 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1960), cert. granted, 365 U.S. 842 (1961). 
44. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437, 444–45 (1963).   
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of First Amendment law, but also amazingly persists. To this day, the 
filing of litigation by public interest groups remains fully protected 
against state regulations of the kind that Virginia officials had vigorously 
sought to apply and enforce. 
Although there were other major free speech and press cases before 
the Court that Term, the most notable ruling on the Term’s final day 
turned out to involve not speech and press but religious liberty under the 
First Amendment. After a cursory ruling against the New York Regents’ 
Prayer, the Justices—with Justice Brennan now fully in command—
were ready to declare virtually all public school prayer and Bible reading 
in the classroom a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.45 
Nonetheless, the law clerks of the 1962 Term (including one Stewart 
clerk who held over and thus served a two-year stint through planned 
rotation) were curiously unprepared for the docketing and eventual 
granting of the New York Times libel case. The Court had without 
fanfare or even much notice granted review in January 1963. The 
petition was filed on behalf of the Times by former Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell, Herbert Wechsler, and Marvin Frankel (along with 
Thomas Daly). Such early publicity as the case garnered seemed to have 
been focused more on the civil rights context than on defamation or 
media dimensions, though it would be difficult to avoid both facets. 
During the ensuing weeks, the principal supporting briefs were filed by 
the Times, the national ACLU and the national NAACP. 
The oral argument, by bizarre coincidence, began exactly one year to 
the day from the granting of the case on January 6, 1963, and engaged 
Herbert Wechsler as lead counsel in a fascinating set of issues. An 
accompanying footnote in the opinion made clear that there were 
actually two closely linked cases, the other involving Ralph Abernathy 
and others who had taken out the advertisement that eventually appeared 
in the Times and resulted in the litigation.46 
Of the many curious features of the case, perhaps none was more 
puzzling than the early March date of its announcement. In the previous 
Term, virtually all the major decisions came down late in the spring—if 
not on the very last day of the Term, within a day or two of the Court’s 
rising for the summer. Only when the other major New York Times 
case47 (involving the Pentagon Papers) was argued at a special Term 
after the close of the regular Term was that pattern varied substantially. 
                                                     
45. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
46. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 n.18 (1964). 
47. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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And since this was clearly a case of utmost importance to the mass 
media—which at that time of course meant all print or traditional radio 
and television channels with a handful of cable outlets—attention on the 
judgment would have been expected to have been even greater than 
might usually have been the case with a major civil rights controversy. 
Much more could be said and written about the New York Times 
ruling as we approach its semi-centennial. Of the many pertinent 
observations one might offer, none is more striking than the narrowness 
of the ruling. The initial scope of the claimed privilege did not exceed 
the official acts of public officials, leaving to later resolution hard 
questions such as how far down in the public service the privilege might 
extend, or even whether it extended beyond the “official acts” or 
transgressions of a government officer to include private conduct. 
Indeed, within weeks of the judgment, I recall writing a brief comment 
confidently adding that “of course an accusation based on the mayor’s 
nightly trysts would not be covered.” 
Perhaps most perplexing among the immediately unresolved issues 
was one that remains curiously unclear to this day: to what level within 
the public service does the scope of the privilege extend? On one hand, 
even the humblest kitchen worker employed by government to carry out 
defined tasks should be covered. On the other hand, early analysis of the 
New York Times case reinforced the fact that the privilege most clearly 
applies to members of the public service who have achieved at least mid-
level positions. Thus, the governor’s kitchen staff should not logically be 
included in the scope of the privilege. Also awaiting later resolution 
were such obviously pertinent issues as how far back in time the scope 
of the privilege might extend. Those and a host of other issues were 
quite clearly reserved for a later day. 
Even more clearly waiting in the wings were two other issues that 
would eventually resurface. First, of course, was the lurking question of 
what to do about libel plaintiffs who were not public officials though 
endowed with a degree or notoriety that would entitle them to 
comparable attention and arguably also to analogous legal status.48 
While the judgment in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts49 was unanimous, 
it was apparent that several of the Justices would prefer to proceed 
further or in a different direction, and before long misgivings would 
emerge. Eventually the Justices would encounter perplexing questions 
about not only plaintiffs who were clearly public figures though not 
                                                     
48. E.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
49. Id. 
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public officials, but also even more challenging questions about the 
status of persons who had inadvertently been implicated in such disputes 
and were thus “involuntary public figures.”50 
For the most part, we should defer detailed analysis of such later libel 
litigation. But before we leave the stage entirely, it would be helpful to 
bridge very briefly the twenty-year gap between New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan and several cases that followed New York Times but preceded 
Greenmoss Builders. Thus, it might be helpful to provide summary notes 
about these interim steps on a journey that began in such a promising 
fashion, only to be derailed or diverted by Greenmoss Builders, but that 
happily led to an eventual redemption at the close of Justice Brennan’s 
career and well beyond. 
V.  GREENMOSS BUILDERS ANTECEDENTS: TEMPORAL 
SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE, “PUBLIC FIGURES,” AND 
BEYOND 
Barely two years followed before the Court would be obliged to begin 
refining the complex implications of the New York Times ruling. 
Curiously, the earliest such development, in Monitor Patriot v. Roy,51 
involved the issue of how far back in time the scope of the privilege 
should extend. Although such a ruling may have seemed unlikely, it was 
surely possible that the timing issue would be resolved by treating the 
privilege either prospectively, or if retrospective, of quite limited 
duration. But to the surprise of many observers, and despite the rather 
modest status of the particular plaintiff, the Court promptly extended the 
timeline back indefinitely.52 Such a broad reach not only strongly 
reinforced the basic New York Times privilege ruling, but it also gave 
enhanced importance to temporal terms. Others might have argued that, 
given the failure of memories and even the passage from the scene of 
contemporary observers, a far more stringent time limit should have 
been imposed. This early ruling settled the first of the post-New York 
Times questions, but left many more open. 
During the 1966 Term, the Court would tackle with comparable 
conviction the question of “public figures.” It seemed quite conceivable 
that the Justices would have drawn an early line between those who held 
public office, either elected or appointed, and everyone else. There was a 
quite plausible basis for that distinction: Justice Black in his New York 
                                                     
50. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
51. 401 U.S. 265 (1971). 
52. Id. at 277. 
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Times concurrence53 cited Barr v. Matteo,54 in which the Court 
recognized a quasi-constitutional privilege that would shield public 
officials who uttered defamatory but not malicious statements against 
others.55 
The putative pairing or juxtaposition of these two precepts not only 
seemed to offer an appropriate balance, but also strongly suggested that 
the New York Times privilege should be confined to those who held 
public office. Yet in the two pivotal key public figure cases, Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts56 and Associated Press v. Walker,57 no such 
insistence upon parity or balance ever applied. The best that a now 
sharply split Court could manage to affirm was concurrence in principle 
(though not in detail) on the status of public figures and their rough 
equivalency to public officials. But within three years of the New York 
Times ruling, any semblance of complete accord had vanished. 
Moreover, to this day the Court has failed to draw a workable line not 
only within the public sector, but also far more problematically within 
the elusive category of “public figures.” 
The even more challenging and elusive questions about the status of 
“involuntary” or “derivative” public figures created deeper doubts. 
There already existed a substantial group of persons who had not thrust 
themselves into the spotlight or actually sought publicity, but were close 
relatives or business or professional colleagues of clearly public figures. 
The pros and cons of treating such persons as public figures or not for 
libel privilege purposes can become bewilderingly challenging. 
By the mid-1990s, for example, major media outlets as normally 
congruent as the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and Cable News Network 
had drawn editorial swords over the question of whether the Atlanta 
Centennial Olympic Park security guard who found and defused a 
planted bomb should or should not be termed a “public figure” on the 
basis of publicity he either actively sought or at least welcomed.58 Other 
intriguing cases on the “involuntary” or “derivative” public figure issue 
created comparable quandaries.59 Thus, very soon after the seemingly 
harmonious view engaged the Court in New York Times, dispersion and 
                                                     
53. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (Black, J. concurring). 
54. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).  
55. See id. at 568–74. 
56. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
57. Id. (consolidated with Butts). 
58. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
59. See, e.g., Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1978). 
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confusion seemed inescapable. 
VI.  THE FINAL ANTECEDENTS: ROSENBLOOM AND GERTZ—
ON THE PATH TO GREENMOSS BUILDERS 
If the high Court was already uncertain about how to move gracefully 
from public officials to public figures, even greater complexity would 
soon follow. Although each of the two major pre-Greenmoss Builders 
rulings deserves ample treatment on its own, let me simply note them 
both in passing. For one thing, the composition of the Court changed 
dramatically during this period. Between the “public figure” saga and 
Greenmoss Builders, Chief Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice 
Warren, while Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and 
Stevens replaced successors, leaving only Justices Brennan and White. 
Appropriately enough, they would eventually square off on opposing 
sides: Justice Brennan as the persistent champion of the New York Times 
libel privilege and Justice White as its most consistent critic. 
The fragmentation of the erstwhile Warren (and now Burger) Court 
had now persisted apace, creating few opportunities to achieve 
consensus on any but the most rudimentary procedural matters. In 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,60 for example, Justice Brennan could 
still speak for a badly frayed bench, with the support of the new Chief 
Justice, the partial concurrence of Justices Black and White, and over the 
dissents of such strange bedfellows as Justices Harlan, Marshall, and 
Stewart. Mercifully, Justice Douglas was apparently indisposed, and 
thus took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. While 
Justice Brennan did manage to cobble together a plurality that broadly 
conveyed his commitment to the New York Times privilege, it was 
hardly a ringing endorsement. In the end, the Justices could agree only 
that the plaintiff, the outspoken distributor of sexually explicit 
magazines, had failed to meet the requisite standard of proof to create a 
jury issue, thus resolving the case by default in favor of the allegedly 
defamatory broadcaster.61 
If things could possibly deteriorate further, that is precisely what 
occurred a few years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.62 In 1974, a 
prominent Chicago attorney had been the subject of an article in a right-
wing publication in which the attorney was labeled a “Communist” and 
a member of an allegedly Marxist organization. Although the lower 
                                                     
60. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).  
61. Id. at 56–57.  
62. 418 U.S. 323 (1975). 
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courts had applied a relatively conventional New York Times analysis, an 
even more sharply divided Supreme Court now announced on the 
Term’s last day a plurality opinion. The core of the ruling—in clear 
rejection of New York Times teachings—was that the outspoken attorney 
was not a public figure, and that “[a]bsent clear evidence of general 
fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the 
affairs of society,” the public-figure issue should be shaped on the basis 
of the individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise 
to the alleged defamation, following state law, though without imposing 
liability without fault.63 The opinion made clear for the first time a 
premise of the Court’s more moderate majority: that the state interest in 
compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals is greater 
than for public officials and public figures.64 Thus, the current majority 
categorically rejected Justice Brennan’s premise that the New York 
Times standard should be extended to media defamation of private 
individuals whenever an issue of general or public interest is involved 
because that would abridge to an unacceptable degree the legitimate 
state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation. 
VII.  GREENMOSS BUILDERS: A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE 
The Greenmoss Builders case65 might be loosely analogized to 
Charles Dickens’ Tale of Two Cities. It was in one sense the best of 
cases, yet also the worst of cases. At a more than superficial level, it 
should never have been granted in the first place. It was essentially a 
trivial common law tort case, which Justice Powell in his concluding 
comment described as involving “only a matter of private interest to the 
parties.”66 As the Court’s internal divisions became ever deeper, the only 
merciful disposition would have been to dismiss as “improvidently 
granted.” The likelihood of any coherent outcome seemed increasingly 
remote as the months progressed. The case seemed increasingly to bring 
out the worst among normally concordant Justices. And the steady, if 
sometimes uneven, evolution from New York Times would arguably 
have benefited from avoidance of the sort of fracturing that the merciful 
disposition of “improvidently granted” could have offered. 
But that’s only half the story, and the lesser half at that. While 
Greenmoss Builders may not deserve to be heralded as “the best of 
                                                     
63. Id. at 352. 
64. See id. at 343–48. 
65. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
66. Justice Powell, typewritten statement of bench announcement, supra note 2, at 2. 
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times,” it contained some important redeeming qualities. Professor 
Wermiel and Mr. Levine collaborated on a splendid study of a case that 
truly challenged their First Amendment expertise to the utmost, and 
which now offers a model of great value to scholars in this field. At least 
five or six major issues invited close observers to untangle critical 
dimensions of New York Times and other intervening cases such as Gertz 
and Rosenbloom: the perplexing media/non-media defendant distinction, 
the presumed and punitive damage issue, the contrasting analysis of 
public versus private speech, and the current status of the eternal tension 
between the interests of those who have been defamed and those who 
express defamatory thoughts. Each and every one of these cosmic issues 
merits a level of detail and analysis that we would never have enjoyed 
but for this seminal Article. And not least of all, the ultimate condition 
of the applicable constitutional precepts has fared surprisingly well over 
time despite the vagaries of this branch of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
 
